| THE ROLE OF THE TURKISH STRATEGISTS IN SHAPING THE EARLY CONCEPTIONS OF DEFENSE OF THE DARDANELLES (SEPTEMBER 1914 – MARCH 18, 1915) Piotr Nykiel © Until now, West European history consistently diminishes the actual role of the Turkish strategists in shaping the conception of the Dardanelles’ defense in front of the Allied attack, ascribing its authorship mainly to the German officers. A great deal of attention is being devoted to the origin of strategy of the Gallipoli peninsula’s defense in the case of the landing operation, which took place on April 25, 1915. In this context – not always objectively and very often even uncritically – the 5th Army’s commander Gen. Liman von Sanders’ role is being displayed. Not many historians take into consideration the fact that the authors for earlier preparations for the defense of the Dardanelles, which had already begun in September 1914, contrary to the beliefs common in the West – were Turkish officers. In many respects, these preparations determined the later war efforts, not only at sea, but also on land, including at the Gallipoli peninsula. Beyond all doubt, the foundations of defense strategy of the Dardanelles had been laid by the then commander of the Chanak Fortified Zone, Major General Cevat (Çobanli) who, on August 2, 1914, asked the General Headquarters to prepare the defense plan for the Dardanelles. It seems that Cevat Pasha’s postulate had been left without response, because he had to repeat it on October 7, 1914 – once more with no result (1). Under such circumstances, on September 20, 1914, the commander of the Chanak Fortified Zone sent a report-directive to the General Headquarters concerning the condition of defenses of the area under his responsibility. The document also included several variants of developments after the possible attack on the straits, predicted by the author, and suggestions concerning a means of opposing the enemy’s ships. The lecture of the above-mentioned report is shocking. Analyzing the first possible variant of attack on the Dardanelles by the Allied Navy, Cevat Pasha outlined the development of events identical in every detail to the action plan accepted by the Allies only in January 1915! What is more interesting – the commander of the Chanak Fortified Zone had judged this kind of venture unreal. Later in his report, Major General Cevat described very precisely the defense of the strait. This entailed shifting the main burden of responsibility onto the central forts, which were grouped around Çanakkale (Chanak) and Kilitbahir, and thus assumed the fall of the Entrance Concentration, consisting of Kumkale (Fort No. 6) and Orhaniye (Fort No. 4) forts on the Asiatic cost, and Seddülbahir (Fort No. 3) and Ertugrul (Fort No. 1) on the South of Gallipoli peninsula. He then made some corrections in the directive dated October 7, 1914, but they did not affect the general concept. As we already mentioned, the above document was only a combination of report and directive, and not an officially approved plan. The other trace of the intention to create such a plan we find in another directive that was received this time by the Chanak Fortified Zone from the General Headquarters in Istanbul on October 22, 1914. It announced the formation of a special commission, headed by the General Headquarters delegate, German vice-admiral Merten. Under his leadership, the coastal artillery expert and later commander of Anadolu Hamidiye (Hamidieh I) fort, Lieutenant Commander Wossidlo, in cooperation with the chief of headquarters of Chanak Fortified Zone, were supposed to create the defense plan, which was finally approved on November 8, 1914. The concept admitted by the German-Turkish commission turned out to be identical to the guidelines of Cevat Pasha’s directive. Certainly the bombardment of the entrance forts on November 3, 1914 had contributed to the fact that the plan was approved in that shape and at that time. However, without any doubt, we should ascribe the authorship of the defense plan against the naval attack on the Dardanelles to Major General Cevat Çonbanli. He too should be considered as the winner in the struggle against the Allied Navy, not the German advisors, as many historians in Western Europe, on the Antipodes and even in Turkey want. There is a clear discrepancy between the authors of two studies published in the same series by the Printing Office of the Turkish General Headquarters. In the first one (Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, V nci Cilt, Çanakkale Cephesi Harekati, I nci Kitap [...]), we can read that the authors of the plan were the above-mentioned Germans. And in the second one (Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi. Deniz Harekati), in appendixes (2), we find the full text of both of Cevat Pasha’s directives dated September 20 and October 7, 1914. The total depreciation of the role of German military advisors in defense of the Dardanelles in the discussed period of course is not the aim of this paper. There is no doubt that a German crew had filled first the Orhaniye (No. 4) fort, situated in the entrance to the Dardanelles, and then in majority, but not alone, the fort Anadolu Hamidiye (Hamidieh I) near Çanakkale. However, we must remember that the first of those fortifications did not play a major role, because the fire power and range of the guns of the Allied ships surpassed all the entrance forts which, as we already mentioned, were sentenced to fall, according to the defense plan prepared by Major General Cevat. And the second fort – Anadolu Hamidiye (Hamidieh I) – certainly did not bring greater credit to the battle on March 18, 1915, than Rumeli Mecidiye, located on the opposite side of the strait and commanded and manned completely by the Turkish crew. Undoubtedly the important contribution to defense of the Dardanelles was the so-called Howitzer Zone, commanded by German Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Wehrle. However, we should not forget that this zone was established according to Cevat Pasha’s directive. Finally, we should stress that there are no convincing sources which – as many Western historians would prefer – could confirm that the offensive line of 26 mines laid in Erenköy Cove by the minelayer Nusret on March 8, 1915 and on which ten days later the Allies lost 3 ships, was laid at the German suggestion. Such information we cannot find even in one of the most detailed and objective sources as the dairy of Lieutenant Commander Nazmi Akpinar, then responsible for the minefield in the Dardanelles. In the record dated March 8, 1915 we can read that: “According to the received order, at 5.30 AM, starting from Paleo Castro area until the line of Erenköy the line consisting of 26 carbonic mines was laid by the steamer Nusret (…)” (3). This essence does not state that the Germans participated in any way in this event. But, knowing the division of authority in the Chanak Fortified Zone, we can conclude that the person who gave this order to Lieutenant Commander Akpinar was Cevat Pasha. Chronologically, the second Turkish officer who played an extremely important role in the defense of the strait was the then commander of the 19th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal. Most – not only Turkish – historians working on the military operations in the Dardanelles in 1915-16 unanimously admit that the decisions made by this officer on April 25, 1915 (which was the first day of the Allied landing on the Gallipoli peninsula), and on August 10, the same year during the crucial Turkish counterattack, had an enormous influence on the course and the final result of the struggles in this region. However, not many are aware that Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal forced the high-command of the Chanak Fortified Zone to make changes in the defense plans at a time when nobody in London seriously considered the landing operation. This, in a decisive way, determined the Allied defeat also on the South of Gallipoli peninsula – a place where Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal himself never even had a chance to fight. Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal appeared in the Dardanelles at the turn of January and February 1915. Before he arrived there, he fell into a conflict with the German military advisors and the War Minister Enver Pasha while still in Istanbul, letting them know very clearly that he was not convinced the decision to enter the war on the German side was right. As a kind of reprimand, and undoubtedly with the aim of removing the unruly officer, it was decided to give him command of the reserve unit. Nevertheless, ambitious and experienced in the field (among other things due to the participation in the Tripolitanian War in 1912), Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal actively joined the works on shaping the defense strategy. Following the fall of the entrance forts on February 25, 1915, and the Allied landings at Kumkale and Seddülbahir the day after with the aim of ultimate elimination of the artillery armament of those forts, the Turks started to take into more serious consideration the threat of a large-scale Allied landing operation. Remembering the guidelines of defense doctrine, the high-command of the Chanak Fortified Zone forbid the 9th Division to strengthen its positions on the Asiatic cost in the region of Besige Cove and Kumkale. At the same time, they reiterated the order released on February 26 - in case of an Allied landing in that sector, after showing “indispensable” resistance, all troops should withdraw to Ulupinar, the village located almost on a line with Çanakkale and Kilitbahir. Exactly at this point the final defense had to be organized. Mustafa Kemal had yet many more constructive conclusions of the February 26ths events. He did not find it appropriate to withdraw as far as Kilitbahir plateau in case of an Allied assault on the Gallipoli peninsula. He drew attention of the commanders of “Maydos” concentration, responsible for the defense of this region, to the special strategic importance of the area from Eski Hisarlik Cape through Seddülbahir to Zigin Dere (Gully Ravine). It was not an easy task to defend this ground. The area was relatively small, very flat and thus it was possible to cover it completely with gunfire from the ships supporting the landing operation. Following February 25, 1915 no fortifications were left there. The Allied Navy eliminated the Seddülbahir (No. 3) and Ertugrul (No. 1) forts, which guarded the Southern beaches and were adapted to defense only from the seaside. The only point in this area from which it was possible to watch the enemy’s movements was the hill Alcitepe (Achi Baba). Despite these inconveniences, the high command of the Chanak Fortified Zone consented to the remarks made by Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal and ordered to include the above-mentioned area in the zone defended by the 26th Infantry Regiment. It should be stressed that, according to the previous guidelines, the high command of the Chanak Fortified Zone was willing to hand over the Kirte (Krithia) village and Alcitepe (Achi Baba) hill to the enemy almost without any resistance. As it turned out, those two places were the primary objectives of the Allied troops for the first day of landings. However, history has shown that the Turkish soldiers, having only their trenches as fortifications, managed to effectively oppose the overwhelming enemy and did not let any of the strategic aims admitted by Gen. Ian Hamilton to be achieved [see the map]. Thus there is no doubt that the suggestions put forward by Mustafa Kemal in late February 1915 to a great extent determined the much later defeat of the Allies on the Southern part of the peninsula. On these grounds, we can claim that the key role in creation of the victorious defense strategy of the Dardanelles against the naval attack and in laying the foundations of equally successful defense tactics on the Gallipoli peninsula was played by two outstanding Turkish officers – Major General Cevat Çobanli and Llieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal. Although the role of foreign military advisors was important, it was certainly not decisive at this stage. It is also worthwhile to pay attention to how the lot of those two officers, seemingly having not much in common, had combined. First they had fought arm in arm by Tobruk in 1912, then they met in the Dardanelles. Later on they worked together in the first National Assembly of the Turkish Republic and finally they passed away the same year, in 1938. It should also be stressed that if the defense strategy drawn up by Cevat Pasha failed and the Allied Navy made its way through to Istanbul without any help from land troops, the military operations on the Gallipoli peninsula, which gave rise to the brilliant career of Mustafa Kemal, would not have taken place. Today we can only wonder how the history of Turkey and Europe would have played out and what role the Lieutenant Colonel - known now as Kemal Atatürk - would have had in those circumstances. (1) Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, V nci Cilt, Çanakkale Cephesi Harekati, I nci Kitap (...), p. 44 (2) p. 509-523. (3) Deniz Binbasi Nazmi Akpinar’in Savas Günlügü, 1. Defter, record of February 23, 1330 (March 8, 1915). Source: A paper delivered (in Turkish) on The Fifth International Congress on Atatürk (Ankara - Turkey, December 9, 2003) |
 |